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We conduct a phone survey to examine the attitudes of Ohioans about school choice, which 
includes open enrollment programs, school vouchers, tuition tax credits, and charter schools.  
Previous studies examine more limited forms of choice and investigate fewer possible 
influences.  We find the strongest opposition for school choice by people with graduate degrees 
and people who believe their assigned public school district is excellent.  In fact, people’s 
opinions about their public schools are stronger predictors of school choice support than are 
objective measures of school quality.  We find people with children in private schools and 
people with associate’s degrees to be the strongest supporters.  Males tend to oppose choice 
and blue collar workers support it.  We find no role for age, the convenience of alternative 
schools, or the protection of house values in support for school choice. 
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   Introduction 
  In recent decades many nations have introduced forms of school choice.  These school 
choice programs take the form of open enrollment, tuition tax credits, school vouchers, and 
charter schools.  Each program makes it less costly for a person to send a child to a school other 
than the tax-funded school to which he is assigned.  Bangladesh, Belize, Chile, Colombia, Czech 
Republic, Guatemala, Ivory Coast, Lesotho, Poland, Sweden, and the United Kingdom have 
systems where vouchers may be used toward the public or private school of the parents’ 
choice.  British Columbia, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, Japan, the Netherlands, 
Belgium, France, and New Zealand also have state support for private schools.
1  Within the U.S., 
voucher programs have been proposed or enacted in California, Florida, Michigan, Louisiana, 
Maine, D.C., Colorado, Indianapolis, Milwaukee, San Antonio, Atlanta, Cleveland, Vermont, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, Maryland, Washington, Wyoming, Georgia, Kansas and other states 
and cities (Merrifield, 2002; Kenny, 2005).  In 2005 the Arizona senate passed an unrestricted 
private school voucher bill.  In 2006 Governor Pataki introduced a tax credit for parents in New 
York who choose private schools, joining six other states that have private school tuition tax 
credits or deductions.  33 states have open enrollment programs, including 15 states that 
require inter-district open enrollment; and charter schools are found in 45 U.S. states.   
How has school choice become so prevalent?  Supporters of choice have won many 
battles against those who oppose school choice.  So who are its supporters and opponents?  To 
answer this question, we conduct a phone survey in Ohio to examine attitudes about school 
choice.  Ohio provides an excellent sample as there are a variety of public and private schools, a 
voucher experiment, and an open enrollment program in the state The survey results are linked to an especially rich data set that includes information about respondents’ houses, the quality 
of local schools, and demographic characteristics of the neighborhoods in which they live.  Our 
unique data set allows us to re-examine prior studies’ findings and test new hypotheses. 
We find no independent role for income in the support for school choice for the general 
public; however, we find that public school users go from supporting to opposing choice as 
their incomes rise.  Unlike prior studies, we find no role for age, and no evidence that people 
base their opinions about school choice on protecting property values.  We find the first 
evidence that males oppose school choice more than women, and that blue collar workers 
support school choice.  We explore the complementary roles of objective and subjective school 
quality measures on support for school choice.  Prior literature shows conflicting results for 
whether blacks, highly-educated people, and people close to alternative schools support school 
choice.  We find blacks and people with associate’s degrees support choice, while proximity to 
alternative schools has no relationship with support for school choice.  And we confirm the 
findings of prior literature that private school users favor choice and people living in high-
performing public school districts oppose it. 
 
Analytical Framework 
  Random utility provides the basis for our empirical model.  To motivate our analysis, we 
focus on the utility derived from local public goods consumption, under the assumption of 
separability of public goods and other consumption goods.  Further, local public goods are 
considered jointly consumed with house and other neighborhood characteristics.  The resulting 
utility function is U(Z, G; ),  where Z represents a vector of property characteristics, G represents a vector of local public goods, and  represents a vector of individual demographic 
and attitudinal characteristics.   
Consider the school voucher form of school choice program.  Through competitive 
effects or cream-skimming, a voucher program might affect the quality of public schools, an 
important local public good.  We amend the utility function to be U(Z, G, v; δ) where v 
represents the voucher, taking the value 1 for voucher supporters and 0 otherwise. 
Not everyone approves of the idea of school vouchers.  We posit that individuals will 
support the use of vouchers if their utility with school choice (v=1) is higher than without (v=0), 
i.e.  U(Z, G, 1; )> U(Z, G, 0; ).  Inherent in this specification is the assumption that vouchers 
represent a reallocation of tax dollars, which has no effect on individual tax bills. 
  Empirically, the above relationship translates to a discrete choice model, where the 
researcher can only observe utility with error.  Specifically, we assume that utility is 
represented by a linear function of property characteristics and parameters Z’α, public goods  
G’β, and personal characteristics and parameters D’δ so that we write the relationship as U(Z’ α 
+ G’β + D’δ; 1) + 1 > U(Z’ α + G’β+ D’δ; 0) + 0, or U(Z’ α + G’β+ D’δ; 1) - U(Z’ α + G’β+ D’δ; 0) > 
0 - 1.  This formulation translates into the familiar probit specification where Pr(v=1)=Φ(Z’ α + 
G’β+ D’δ) and Pr(v=0)=1-Φ(Z’ α + G’β+ D’δ), where Φ(
.
) represents the standard normal 
distribution.  
 
Data 
The survey sample frame is based on a data set of 44,495 houses sold in Ohio in 2000 
that had valid house characteristics, latitude and longitude, Census identifiers, and school district identifiers.  We contracted with the Public Policy Research Lab of Louisiana (PPRL) to 
conduct a telephone survey based on these 44,495 houses in 2006-2007.  The first wave of the 
survey started with a stratified random sample of 8,629 houses.  The house addresses were 
sent to a web-based marketing service that associates phone numbers with addresses, yielding 
5,084 phone numbers for the houses in our sample.  PPRL’s trained survey interviewers 
contacted valid phone numbers multiple times, resulting in 710 completed phone surveys.  The 
second wave of the survey started with 10,000 addresses drawn from the 35,866 houses that 
had not yet been sampled; in order to help mitigate response clustering, these 10,000 were 
drawn using a stratification scheme that oversampled low-response school districts from the 
first survey wave.  The second wave yielded 5,415 phone numbers and 762 completed surveys.  
For the two rounds of the survey, the raw response rate is 14%.  After eliminating calls to 
disconnects, businesses, fax machines, no answer and households with no eligible respondent, 
the adjusted response rate is 22%.
2   Of the 1,472 completed surveys, 232 were eliminated for 
item non-response.  
Most of the variables used in the study come from the phone survey, but data from 
other sources are required to test additional hypotheses.  We use the percentage of students 
who are proficient or above proficient on the 12
th grade Ohio math proficiency test as a 
measure of public school district performance (Ohio Department of Education, 2002a).  The 
address of each private school in Ohio was geocoded to yield its latitude and longitude.  We 
then use the latitude and longitude of each house surveyed to find the distance from each 
house to the nearest private school.  The percentage of non-white students in each public 
school district comes from the Vital Statistics of the Ohio Department of Education (2002b).  The number of disciplinary actions in a school district is taken from the Ohio Department of 
Education (2002c).  The year 2000 sale price of the house of each respondent comes from First 
American Real Estate Services (FARES, 2002).  Variable means, definitions, and sources are 
found in Table 1.  In addition, the sample selection regression uses data from the 2000 U.S. 
Census (see Appendix Table A1). 
Ohio has a variety of schooling options.  There are 614 public school districts.  Many of 
these participate in a voluntary open enrollment program.  A majority of  school districts (371) 
allow students to enroll from anywhere in the state; an additional 118, or about 28%,  allow 
only students living in adjacent school districts to enroll; and the remaining 173 school districts 
do not allow any form of open enrollment.  Since 1995, the Cleveland City School District has 
operated the Cleveland Scholarship and Tutoring Program, a school voucher experiment open 
to residents of Cleveland in grades K-8, and the sole voucher program in the state of Ohio.  
Students chosen by lottery to receive the voucher may attend any non-public school within the 
city of Cleveland or any public school district adjacent to Cleveland.  The voucher covers 75% or 
90% of tuition up to the legislated maximum, depending on family income.  The voucher also 
includes transportation.  The Ohio Educational Directory lists 852 non-public schools for all 
grades K-12.  There are many types of private schools in Ohio, including schools for girls, 
Baptist, Orthodox, Lutheran, Catholic, Montessori, Adventist, secular academies, Jewish, 
Islamic, and a school for autistic students.  In addition, there are 292 public charter schools 
specializing in areas such as college prep, technology, leadership, fitness, culture, 
entrepreneurship, science, arts, manufacturing, health care, and maritime training.   
 Literature Review and Hypotheses 
  A handful of other studies examine support for school choice.  Stoddard and Corcoran 
(2007) consider charter school support, and the rest of the studies we found consider school 
vouchers.  Our study considers government-supported school choice of any form.     
Most previous studies examine support for California’s Proposition 38 in 2000 (Brunner 
and Sonstelie, 2003; Brunner, Imazeki and Ross, 2006; Brunner and Imazeki, 2006).  One study 
(Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer, 2001) examines Los Angeles County’s 1993 voucher vote on 
Proposition 174.  Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) examine Chile’s voucher program.  Kenny (2005) 
examines a variety of U.S. voucher votes by Congress and state legislatures, and Stoddard and 
Corcoran (2007) study charter school authorization by state legislatures and charter school 
adoption by school districts.  California is an important state, and Chile’s voucher program has a 
20-year history to examine, but Ohio is certainly worthy of study as well.  It is about as 
representative of the U.S. as any state gets, having six fairly large central cities, hundreds of 
suburbs, small industrial cities outside the urban areas, prosperous rural farm communities, 
and poor rural Appalachian areas.     
  Thanks to the combination of our survey with other data sources, our study has more 
control variables than previous studies.  This allows us to re-examine previous findings and test 
new hypotheses.  The previous studies have from about 3 to 13 explanatory variables, while our 
study has 37.  Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) look at support at the state and school district 
levels.  Kenny (2005) looks at votes by politicians; Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) and Brunner, 
Sonstelie and Thayer (2001) look at preferences at the commune or precinct level.  But our study, like Brunner and Sonstelie (2003), Brunner, Imazeki and Ross (2006), and Brunner and 
Imazeki (2006), examines individual level survey data. 
  In the Results section, we compare our findings to those of prior studies, where 
available.  In this section, we briefly list the hypotheses to be tested.   
-  Does higher income lead to greater or less support for school choice, and does the 
role of income depend on the schools a respondent’s children attend? 
-  Holding income constant, does having a blue collar job make a person more or less 
likely to support school choice? 
-  Are men more likely to oppose school choice than women? 
-  What is the role of race, age, and education in school choice?  Are whites in minority 
public school districts more likely to support choice than other whites? 
-  Do people in high-performing school districts support school choice less?  What if 
school quality is measured by discipline problems?  And are a person’s opinions 
about his own public school, the typical public school, and his nearest private school 
important as well, or do people only care about objective school quality measures? 
-  Do people with school-aged children support choice more than other people, and 
does this support depend on whether the children attend public or private schools? 
-  Do people form their opinions on school choice to protect their property values? 
-  Quality aside, does the accessibility of private schools and alternative public schools 
affect a person’s attitudes toward school choice? 
-  Do people who participate in certain pastimes like bowling and volunteer groups feel 
differently than other people about school choice? -  Does Cleveland’s voucher program have an effect on school choice attitudes in the 
Cleveland area? 
 
Econometric Issues 
  There are many potential estimation issues.  In the case of survey data, potential 
selection bias poses a serious problem.  We develop a selection correction model similar to Hite 
(1998), which relies on neighborhood and housing characteristics to explain survey response.  
In particular, our sample comes from a data set of housing transactions, which includes 
important property characteristics, merged with a large array of local characteristics, such as 
school quality, crime rates and environmental characteristics.   Because the survey deals with a 
potentially controversial issue, individuals living in the worst districts might be more inclined to 
favor vouchers than average, while those in the best districts might be more inclined to oppose 
vouchers, in fear that opening their schools to outsiders could lower quality.  Thus, we expect 
that people at extremes of the school quality distribution will be more likely to respond.
3 
Race and age are other factors with potential to induce selection bias, for which we use 
Census block characteristics as proxies.  Thus, even though we cannot observe the personal 
characteristics of non-responders, we can develop a two-stage selection model (Heckman, 
1974; Maddala, 1986) to mitigate potential bias.  The first stage of the model is a probit that 
predicts the probability that a person responds; from the first stage probit an inverse Mills ratio 
(IMR) is created, which is then used as an explanatory variable in our models of interest, models 
that examine supporters of school choice.  Although we include the IMR in our models of school 
choice, we find it is never statistically significant, suggesting that sample selection bias is perhaps not of great practical concern; we suspect that this may be in part due to the sampling 
scheme employed in the second survey wave.
4  The first stage model is reported in Appendix A, 
along with an in-depth discussion. 
Spatial dependence is a second important issue in our data.  Its presence would 
invalidate standard errors and/or cause biased parameter estimates, necessitating the use of a 
spatial probit model (McMillen, 1992; LeSage, 1999).  However, a likelihood ratio test fails to 
reject the null hypothesis of no spatial dependence, as does a Moran’s I test, so spatial 
dependence is not an issue in the current sample.
5  We suspect that the survey respondents are 
sufficiently geographically dispersed so as to eliminate spatial dependence.   
Another concern is heteroskedasticity.  A Breusch-Pagan test rejects the null of 
homoskedasticity at the 1% level of significance.
6  Despite the presence of heteroskedasticity, 
the standard errors change little when corrections are made.  Jackknifing, robust standard 
errors, and clustered standard errors all provide nearly identical t-ratios to uncorrected 
regressions.  We adopt robust standard errors. 
 
Results 
The first column of results in Table 2 is the baseline regression that tests many of the 
key hypotheses.  Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) find high-income people the most likely to move 
from public to private schools to take advantage of Chile’s voucher program.  Bettinger (1999) 
finds low-income students the most likely to take advantage of charter schools in Michigan, 
while Willms and Echols (1992) find the opposite for Scotland’s voucher program.  Sandy (1992) 
finds Michigan voters less likely to support a voucher initiative the higher their incomes; similarly, Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) find higher-income school districts less likely to support 
charter schools.  However, given the other controls, we find no independent role for income in 
Ohioans’ attitudes toward school choice.  Our lack of income significance may result from the 
wide variance of Tiebout sorting in our sample.
7  Brunner and Imazeki (2006) find higher socio-
economic status can cause people to support or oppose school vouchers, depending on the 
degree of Tiebout choice in an area.  Our sample spans most of Ohio, including rural areas with 
little Tiebout choice, and Cleveland, with 48 school districts and over 100 municipalities.  The 
positive effect of socio-economic status on school choice in areas with little Tiebout sorting may 
be canceling out the negative effect in urban areas.
8 
Older Americans have been found to oppose school choice (Brunner and Sonstelie, 
2003; Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer, 2001; Brunner, Imazeki and Ross, 2006).  We find a 
person’s age is unrelated to support for school choice.  We also find the value of a person’s 
house unrelated to support for school choice.
9  We will have more to say about property values 
in later experiments.  Controlling for race, income and education, we find blue collar workers 
are more likely to support school choice; we suspect the blue collar result may be related to a 
cultural disposition by these workers to provide better futures for their offspring.   In contrast, 
males are less likely to support choice; the marginal effect for Male is the third-strongest in the 
baseline regression, stronger than the presence of children in a household.  This perhaps 
follows from the notion that women are more actively involved in their children’s education 
than men.  In contrast, Brunner, Imazeki and Ross (2006) find no relationship between gender 
and support for school choice.
10   People with children support school choice, all else constant, and the strength of their 
support is similar whether the children are school-aged or younger than school-aged.   
We find racial minorities more likely to support school choice.  Theirs is the second-
strongest marginal effect.  The race and school choice support finding is consistent with Sandy 
(1992) and Howell, et al. (2002), but inconsistent with Brunner and Sonstelie (2003), who find 
race unrelated to support for school vouchers.
11   
The strongest marginal effect in the baseline regression belongs to respondents with 
graduate degrees.  Such people strongly oppose school choice.  This is a different result than 
Hsieh and Urquiola (2006), who find that higher-educated parents were the ones who took 
greatest advantage of Chile’s voucher program.  It also contradicts Stoddard and Corcoran 
(2007), who find higher education levels positively related to charter school support.  But it is 
consistent with Brunner and Sonstelie (2003), who generally find higher education levels 
negatively associated with support for California’s school voucher initiative.   
Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2001) find homeowners in high-performing public 
schools oppose school vouchers.  Sandy (1992) finds people living in low-performing public 
schools strongly support vouchers.  Stoddard and Corcoran (2007) find more support for 
charter schools in public school districts with high dropout rates.  The current study finds 
evidence consistent with these studies.  The better a respondent’s public school district 
performs on a state-wide proficiency test, the less likely the respondent is to favor school 
choice.  This is in keeping with our hypothesis that those in good school districts want to bar 
entrants who may harm school district performance.   The relationship is measured with 
precision, but the marginal effect is only comparable to that of Blue Collar; together, Blue Collar and Public Proficiency have the weakest marginal effects among the statistically significant 
variables. 
We expand upon the baseline results to further explore the role of race in school choice 
support.  The Minority variable is replaced by a series of racial and ethnic variables: Black, 
Hispanic, Asian, Indian, and Other Race.  The results of the Race 1 column of Table 2 show that 
all the minority support for school choice comes from respondents of African descent.  Brunner, 
Imazeki and Ross (2006) find that whites in California in schools with a high proportion of 
minority students support vouchers, but that this result disappears when controlling for the 
quality of the school.  We test this proposition in the Race 2 column of Table 2, creating an 
interaction term between whether the respondent is white and the percentage of minority 
students in his school district.  With the interaction term and school quality included, we find 
the respondent’s race and the racial makeup of his school district are not related to school 
choice support.
12   
A person’s support for school choice depends on the performance of his school district, 
where performance is measured by proficiency test passage.  But there are other ways to 
measure school quality besides proficiency tests.  Another desirable school characteristic is the 
degree to which a school is unruly, disruptive, or dangerous.  We add School Disciplines as a 
competing school quality measure to proficiency passage and see how it is related to school 
choice support.  The School Outcomes 1 column of Table 2 shows that the unruliness of a public 
school is not related to a respondent’s opinion on school choice, but that proficiency passage 
remains a significant influence.  When School Disciplines is included instead of proficiency passage in an unreported regression, School Disciplines still fails to achieve statistical 
significance. 
Objective measures of school quality can be important, but a person’s subjective 
opinions about school quality may also matter.  Opinions may capture something different than 
objective measures of quality.  Converting respondents’ unobserved utility rankings to linear 
categorical rankings is not ideal, but is useful for exploring the impact of people’s opinions.  We 
assign values from 1 to 5 depending on whether the respondent believes his assigned public 
school district is poor, not good, fair, good, or excellent.  The resulting variable is Opinion Own 
Public.  When Opinion Own Public substitutes for proficiency test scores, the opinion variable is 
negative and statistically significant, indicating that those who think highly of their assigned 
public schools tend to oppose school choice.  In the School Outcomes 3 column of Table 3, 
when both the opinion variable and the proficiency test variable are included simultaneously, 
both are statistically significant, suggesting that opinion and objective quality measures each 
capture something different.  In fact, the opinion variable has a larger t-ratio than the objective 
measure of quality.  The importance of subjective measures is also validated in the medical 
literature:  subjective measures of health strongly predict mortality even controlling for physical 
health (Ofstedal et al., 2003). 
Recognizing the limitations of our Opinion Own Public variable, we substitute a series of 
dummy variables for whether the respondent believes his assigned public school is excellent, 
good, or fair, with not good and poor as omitted categories.  The School Outcomes 4 column of 
Table 3 shows that the opinion variables dominate the proficiency variables.  Respondents who 
think their public school is excellent oppose school choice, as do those who believe their public school is good.  Public Excellent (-0.17) and Public Good (-0.14) have the largest marginal effects 
in the regression, at least as large as that of Graduate Degree (-0.13).  There is no difference in 
support for school choice between people who believe their public school is fair, and those who 
think it is not good or poor. 
Opinions about their own public schools obviously affect a person’s support for school 
choice, but perceptions of the quality of the typical public school in the state and the nearest 
private school may also matter.  The typical public school represents a baseline measure of 
quality against which to measure one’s own school, while those who believe the closest public 
school to be good or excellent may support choice as a means to increase government financial 
support.  We thus first add Opinion Typical Public to the proficiency test variable in the School 
Outcomes 5 column of Table 3.  The results show that a respondent is less likely to support 
school choice if he resides in a school district with good proficiency test passage, and he is less 
likely to support choice the higher his opinion of the quality of the typical public school in the 
state.  In the School Outcomes 6 column we replace Opinion Typical Public with Opinion Own 
Private.  The two opinion variables eliminate the influence of proficiency test scores.  The 
higher one’s esteem for his assigned public school, the less he supports school choice; the 
higher one’s esteem for the nearest private school, the more he supports school choice.   
Having a high level of education clearly reduces support for school choice, all else 
constant.  What is the effect of other levels of education?  We include the five lowest 
educational categories in the regression, with bachelor’s and graduate degrees as the omitted 
categories.  The results appear in the Education column of Table 3.  The results indicate that it is 
not the lowest education people who most strongly support school choice.  With Some College failing to achieve statistical significance, we find all the action in the lower education categories 
belongs to people with associate’s degrees who did not get bachelor’s degrees.  People with 
associate’s degrees are more likely to support school choice than people with higher education.  
In fact the 0.15 marginal effect for Associate rivals that of Graduate Degree (-0.13), and both 
are nearly as strong as Public Excellent (-0.17). 
So far we have discovered that having children—especially school-aged children—
increases a person’s support for school choice.  But the motivation is unclear.  Parents may be 
using public schools and want choice to attend a different public school or a private school.  Or 
parents may be using private schools and want tuition relief from the government.  Some 
parents even use a combination of public and private schools for their children.  We investigate 
the influence of the type of school a respondent uses for his children on his support for school 
choice.  The Kids 1 column of results in Table 4 suggests that support for school choice does not 
come from parents with children in public schools.  Such parents are no more or less likely to 
favor choice than respondents without children.  However, parents sending their children 
exclusively to private school, or to a combination of public and private schools, are more likely 
to support school choice.  The marginal effect of Attend Both is 0.16, nearly the strongest in the 
study.  But the strongest marginal effect in the study, 0.22, goes to Attend Private.  We 
speculate that parents sending their children to private schools strongly favor school choice in 
hopes of reducing their tuition expenditures.  By comparison, Kenny (2005) studies school 
voucher successes in state legislatures.  In three of four specifications, he finds no relationship 
between private school market share and voucher passage in state legislatures.  Perhaps state 
representatives are ignoring constituents who use private schools in favor of the more numerous non-users.  Similar to our study, Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2001) find more 
support for school choice in precincts with a higher private school market share. 
Brunner and Sonstelie (2003) find the role of income depends on whether the person 
has children in public or private school.  To test this proposition, we include interaction terms 
between income and the school attendance variables in the Kids 2 column of Table 4.  The 
interaction term eliminates the significance of Attend Both, and Income remains insignificant.  
However, both Attend Public and Attend Public*Income become statistically significant.  
Together, the results support part of Brunner and Sonstelie.  Our results suggest that lower-
income people who use public schools support school choice, but as income rises, public school 
users oppose school choice, once again bolstering our supposition that there is a certain level of 
protectionism towards good local schools.  Brunner and Sonstelie find that for people with 
children in public schools, higher income reduces support for California’s school voucher 
program.  They also find for people with children in private schools, higher income increases 
support for school choice, a finding not supported by our data. 
In the hedonic literature, one of the strongest non-structural contributors to house price 
is the quality of the public school district to which the house is assigned (Haurin and Brasington, 
1996).  People pay a premium to live in a house with a high-performing public school, and 
receive a house price discount for having a low-performing public school.  Some research (Hoyt, 
1996; Reback, 2005) finds a relationship between house prices and school choice through the 
capitalization of public school quality.  Minnesota’s open enrollment program lets some 
students attend a different school than the one to which their house is assigned.  Hoyt and 
Reback find that house prices fall in school districts that accept students from lower-performing school districts, and house prices rise in areas where students transfer to better-performing 
school districts.  Given these findings, we suspect that people with expensive houses and those 
in high-performing school districts have the most to lose with school choice, so we include both 
proficiency test passage and the sale price of a respondent’s house as regressors.  We find that, 
all else constant, the sale price of a person’s house is not related to their support for school 
choice.  In contrast, Brunner, Sonstelie and Thayer (2001) find less support for school vouchers 
in California precincts with a high house price premium for school quality. 
But a test of the capitalization motive for supporting and opposing school choice must 
focus on the Public Proficiency variable.  Its negative sign in the Baseline regression could 
reflect a motive of protecting house prices:  people with high-performing schools vote against 
choice to preserve the house price premium they paid to live in a good school district.  But the 
negative sign could also reflect people’s satisfaction with school quality in high-performing 
school districts.  To separate these hypotheses, we restrict the sample to the 493 homeowners 
who have no children.  If Public Proficiency is negative in this sample, it suggests people in high-
performing school districts oppose choice to protect property values.
13  The results in the 
Capitalization column of Table 4 do not support this scenario, as the Public Proficiency variable 
fails to achieve statistical significance.  Further study is required, but the results call into 
question the role of capitalization of school quality into house price as a factor determining 
people’s support for school choice.  People in high-performing school districts seem to oppose 
choice simply because they are satisfied with the quality of their public school districts, and 
conversely, they support choice because they are dissatisfied with their public school districts.   Another failed experiment was to include respondents’ pastimes as proxies for 
underlying attitudes that could be determinants of school choice support.  In certain previous 
experiments with a similar data set, we found that bowlers were more likely to support school 
choice, but in an in unreported regression, we find that participating in fishing, yachting, arts, 
skiing, bowling, golf, dining, Nascar, crafts, and music are unrelated to support for school 
choice.  We also wondered if living in the Cleveland MSA would affect a person’s support for 
choice, given that Cleveland has an active voucher experiment.  However, an unreported 
regression shows a Cleveland MSA dummy is insignificant. 
Controlling for quality, proximity to public schools generally commands a house price 
premium (Owusu-Edusei, et al. 2007).  By extension, proximity to private schools may make 
people stronger supporters of school choice, just as proximity makes people more likely to use 
private schools (Fairlie and Resch, 2002).  They may have moved close to private schools 
because their children use them, or at any rate they face a lower transportation cost of using 
private schools than people living farther away, making them more likely to take advantage of a 
tuition tax credit.  To test whether people who live near private schools are more likely to 
support school choice, we add Distance to Private to the regression.  The results appear in the 
Distance 1 column of Table 4.  Despite its theoretical appeal, we find no evidence that proximity 
to a private school affects a person’s support for school choice, all else constant.  In an 
unreported regression, we find the interaction terms between having children and the distance 
to private schools are also insignificant, so that neither parents nor the general public seems to 
care about the distance to private schools when assessing their support for school choice.  
Because Cleveland has an experimental voucher program, residents of Cleveland may be more sensitive to distance to private schools.  But in another unreported regression, we find that 
Cleveland residents are no different than everyone else concerning distance to private schools. 
Another way to measure the convenience of private schools recognizes that private 
schools are less common in rural areas.  In addition, because rural housing is more dispersed 
than urban housing, the distance from a house to a private school is likely to be higher in rural 
areas.  Furthermore, in rural areas there is less choice in public school alternatives, and the 
nearest public school may be farther away than in urban areas.  We use the percentage of 
houses in a Census block group that are in rural areas to proxy for alternative school 
convenience, and report regression results in the Distance 2 column.  Hsieh and Urquiola (2006) 
find the largest growth in market share for private schools in Chile’s voucher program was in 
urban areas.  Brunner, Imazeki and Ross (2006) find people in rural areas more supportive of 
California’s voucher initiative in about half their regressions.  But using Rural, our results again 
fail to show a relationship between convenience of private school alternatives and support for 
school choice. 
 
Conclusion 
  Our study examines individual support for school choice in Ohio, a typical American 
state with charter schools, a voluntary open enrollment policy, a limited school voucher 
program, and ample private school alternatives.  The strongest supporters of school choice are 
people with children who attend private schools, who have a marginal effect of 0.22.  The next-
strongest marginal effect belongs to people who believe their assigned public school is 
excellent (-0.17).  Interestingly, people’s opinions about school quality have a much stronger effect on school choice support than do more objective measures of school quality, like 
proficiency test passage and school discipline problems.  Strong effects are found for people 
whose children attend both public and private schools (0.16) and people who believe their 
assigned public school is good (-0.14).  Similarly strong effects are found for a respondent’s 
education level, pitting those with graduate degrees (-0.13) and associate’s degrees (0.15) 
against each other, with no significant effects found for any other education level.   
Ours is the first study to find gender systematically related to school choice support: 
men support school choice less than women.  Our study also discovers that having a blue collar 
occupation independently raises the probability of support for school choice.  Unlike prior 
studies, we find no role for age or the availability of convenient public and private school 
alternatives in the support for school choice.  The presence of an active voucher experiment in 
Cleveland does not affect support for school choice in the Cleveland area.  We also do not find 
that people’s support for school choice is designed to protect their property values.   
The role of race and income continues to be debated in the literature.  We find 
minorities—specifically blacks—favor school choice more than whites.  We find no independent 
role for income in support for school choice among Ohioans as a whole.  But we find that 
among users of public schools, those with lower incomes are more likely to support choice, 
while those with higher incomes are more likely to oppose school choice. 
There are many remaining issues that could still be investigated.  Our study examines 
the support for school choice in general, but it would be nice to see which groups of people 
support public school choice but not private school choice, and vice versa.  Our study goes hand 
in hand with many of the Brunner papers in trying to figure out people’s motives for supporting and opposing choice, but a more thorough investigation of these motives is needed.  The 
growth of school choice suggests that its proponents are politically more powerful than those 
who oppose school choice.  Still, it would be informative to examine if supporters of choice are 
more politically active.  It would also be interesting to find out which groups of people are 
undecided about school choice, and thus still open to influence by pro- and anti-choice groups’ 
propaganda.   
 
Appendix A:  Sample Selection 
  Sample selection bias is a serious concern for survey data.  We correct for sample 
selection bias using the two-stage technique of Heckman (1974) and Maddala (1986).  The first 
stage is a regression of whether a person responded to the survey or not.  Although a number 
of school characteristics were tested in the model, the school attendance rate is the only 
significant school measure affecting response rates.  From the model estimates in Table A1, 
neighborhood income characteristics were more likely to affect response.   For example, we 
find those living in more income-heterogeneous Census block groups (CBGs) are more likely to 
respond to the survey; in addition, those in racially heterogeneous areas are also more likely to 
respond.  
 We also find negative environmental factors in a neighborhood, measured by air 
pollution in a Census tract, and proximity to an environmental hazard, contribute significantly 
to willingness to respond to the survey.  We posit that such areas may be more urban, thus 
experiencing lower school quality. In contrast, we find that individuals in blue collar neighborhoods were less likely to 
respond, as were individuals in neighborhoods with high poverty rates.  This may be an artifact 
of the survey methodology, as those in high-poverty areas may be more likely to have their 
phone disconnected, and those in blue-collar neighborhoods may be more likely to work long 
hours and thus be unreachable during the early evening hours in which the survey was 
conducted. 
  Not surprisingly, those with a more vested interest in the survey were more likely to 
respond, as indicated by the significant and positive sign for Babies, the variable indicating 
percentages of households in a CBG with children between 0-4 years old.  Parents of young 
children may think that their participation in the survey could influence the future course of 
local school choice.  Surprisingly, we find that the percentage of individuals in a CBG who have 
never married is a positive factor for survey response.  We would expect a priori that single 
people would take little interest in school issues, although there are two possible explanations: 
first, this may reflect individuals living in CBGs where there are many single parents, and 
second, it is possible this reflects the notion that school quality can be seen as a public good 
that increases property value, which may be a concern of single young professionals.  
Participation is also associated with education levels, with CBG percentages of individuals with 
high school and graduate degrees having a significantly positive effect on response probability. 
  Finally, certain individual housing characteristics contribute to response probability.  For 
example, individuals living in larger houses with patios are more likely to participate, while 
having many bathrooms tends to decrease response probability.  Considering the characteristics of housing stock in a metropolitan area, we suspect that these combined 
characteristics may reflect more urban, as opposed to suburban, neighborhoods. 
  Taken as a whole, the parameter estimates of the response probability model appear to 
suggest that the school choice issue may be of more interest to those in urban rather than 
suburban areas; cross frequencies of population density and response (not reported) support 
this result.   This indicates that there may indeed by selectivity by respondents.   Thus, we 
construct an inverse Mills ratio from this model to incorporate selectivity into our school choice 
support regressions.       
Appendix B:  Survey Instrument 
2006 Housing and Schooling Phone Survey 
 
“Hi, my name is _____________ and I am calling on behalf of the Public Policy Research Lab.  We are 
conducting a survey on housing and school vouchers.  All responses will remain strictly confidential, and 
you may refuse to answer any question or end the survey at any time.  
 
Would you be interested in taking the survey? 
 
[If they ask, research is for Dr. David Brasington of the economics department, Ohio State PhD, for a 
study on school vouchers.  The information will be used for research only and will not be sold to 
telemarketers. IRB contact information given at end of survey.] 
 
First, I would like to start by asking your opinion on public and private schools in your area.   
Would you say that your public school is  __ Excellent  __ Good   ___ Fair  ___ Not Very Good   __ Poor 
Would you say that your nearest private school is  
Excellent  __ Good   ___ Fair  ___ Not Very Good   __ Poor 
 
Would you say that the typical public school in your state is __ Excellent  __ Good   ___ Fair  ___ Not 
Very Good   __ Poor 
 
Should the government spend money to assist families who want to send their children to private or 
religious schools, or should government money only be spent on children who attend public schools? 
__ Spend only on public schools __ Assist private and religious __ Don't Know 
 
Should the government spend money to assist families who want to send their children to a different 
public school than the one they are assigned to? 
__ Yes  __ No  __ Don’t know 
 
Which of the following are the TWO most important reasons you chose your current house? 
__ Local taxes are low 
__ Neighborhood is safe 
__ House is conveniently located 
__ Local public school is good 
__ Pollution levels are low 
 
Did you buy your house in 2000? 
_ Yes  _ After 2000  _I’m a renter 
 
Many states, including Ohio, are considering funding different types of choice programs for schools. 
These programs would allow parents to choose any school -- public or private -- for their children to 
attend from kindergarten through high school. Would you favor or oppose these types of choice 
programs, or haven't you thought much about it? 
__ favor  __ oppose  __haven’t thought much about it 
 [If support vouchers] 
Do you support vouchers because you think vouchers  
1. will increase the value of my house __ yes  __ no 
2. will provide better education for kids in my neighborhood   __ yes  __ no 
3. will make public schools try harder to improve __ yes  __ no 
4. will help support religious schools __ yes  __ no 
5. will help support schools that specialize in certain subjects, like math or the arts __ yes  __ no 
 
[If oppose vouchers] 
Do you oppose vouchers because you think vouchers 
1. will decrease the value of my house __ yes  __ no 
2. will attract worse students to my public school district __ yes  __ no 
3. will take tax money away from public schools __ yes  __ no 
4. will help support religious schools __ yes  __ no 
 
Would you say your yard is:   __ too large   __ too small  __ about right 
 
Did you purchase this house with a realtor? __ Yes  __ No   
Did you parents own a house sometime during their lives?. __ Yes  __ No   
Is this the first house you have owned?. __ Yes  __ No   
Was the initial mortgage on this house a fixed rate mortgage? (not adjustable rate mortgage)  
__ Yes  __ No   
Have you refinanced your mortgage at least once while living in this house? __ Yes  __ No   
Did you participate in a homeownership counseling program before you bought this house? __ Yes  __ 
No   
 
Did you vote in the last election? 
__ Yes  __ No  __ don’t know 
 
Politically, do you tend to be 
__ very conservative 
__ somewhat conservative 
__ moderate 
__ somewhat liberal 
__ very liberal 
 
How many adults 18 or older, including yourself, usually live in your household?  
__ 1  __ 2  __ 3  __ 4 or more 
 
How many children aged 6 to 17 live in your household at least one-half of the time? 
 __ 0 __ 1  __ 2  __ 3  __ 4 or more 
 
How many children aged 0 to 5 live in your household at least half the time? 
__ 0 __ 1  __ 2  __ 3  __ 4 or more 
 
Do the children aged 0 to 17 attend  
__ public schools  __ private schools  __ both  __ not applicable 
 
In which of the following community groups are you currently active? __ condo/homeowner’s association 
__ benevolent society (Elks, etc.) 
__ youth club volunteering 
__ volunteering in public or private schools 
__ youth league coaching 
__ other community groups 
 
How many members of your household, including yourself, are working at paid full-time or part-time jobs? 
__ 0 __ 1  __ 2  __ 3  __ 4 or more 
 
Put together, how many hours do the people in your household work for pay 
__ 0 __ 1-14 __ 15-34  __ 35-54  __ 55-80  __ 81-119  __ 120-159  __ 160+ 
 
In which category does your age fall in to?  
__ 18-21  __ 22-29  __ 30-39 __ 40-49  __ 50-59  __ 60-69  __ 70-79  __ 80+ 
 
How many minutes does it usually take you to commute to work? 
__ less than 10  __ 10-20  __ 20-30 __ 30-45  __ 45-60  __ over 60 
 
Of the following activities, which do you do most often during your leisure time?  
__ fishing 
__ yachting 
__ attend performing arts 
__ skiing 
__ bowling 
__ golfing 
__ fine dining 
__ attend/watch NASCAR 
__ crafts 
__ music 
 
What is your race? 
__ white 
__ African American 
__ Hispanic 
__ Asian or Pacific Islander 
__ American Indian, Intuit, or Aleut 
__ other 
 
What is the highest schooling have you completed? 
__ less than 9
th grade 
__ 9
th to 12
th grade, no diploma 
__ high school graduate or equivalent 
__ some college, no degree 
__ associate’s degree 
__ bachelor’s degree 
__ graduate or professional degree 
 We would like to know what your family income was last year before taxes. 
I will read several income categories. Please stop me when I get to the  
category that includes your family income.  Your best guess is fine. 
[If they refuse to answer remind them that this confidential and 
we are only collecting this information for statistical purposes] 
__ under $10,000 per year 
__ $10,000 to $14,999 
__ $15,000 to $19,999 
__ $20,000 to $24,999 
__ $30,000 to $34,999 
__ $35,000 to $39,999 
__ $40,000 to $44,999 
__ $45,000 to $49,999 
__ $50,000 to $59,999 
__ $60,000 to $99,999 
__ $100,000 to $149,999 
__ over $150,000 
 
Record Gender [DO NOT ASK] 
__ Male  __ Female 
 
What is your marital status? 
__Single, never married __ Married __Divorced __Widowed 
 
Thank you for your time and patience.  If you have any questions about the survey, you can contact 
Robert C. Mathews of LSU’s Institutional Review Board.  His phone number is 225-578-8692, and his 
office is 203 David Boyd Hall.  Ask for IRB #E3305. 
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   Table 1 
Variable Names, Definition, and Means 
Variable  Definition (Source)  Mean 
(Std. Dev.) 
Choice Yes  Dummy variable indicating whether the survey 
respondent favors school choice (=1) or not (1) 
0.44 
(0.50) 
Minority  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent’s race is black, 
Asian, American Indian/Pacific Islander, other non-
white race, or Hispanic any race (1) 
0.15 
(0.36) 
Distance to Private  Distance from respondent’s house to nearest 
private school in miles 
2.80 
(2.80) 
Age  Age of respondent; midpoint of age categories 
asked in survey with 85 used for “85 and above” 
(1) 
42.9 
(12.7) 
Male  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent is male (1)  0.36 
(0.48) 
IMR  Inverse Mills ratio, used to correct for potential 
sample selection bias (2) 
1.64 
(0.13) 
Public Proficiency  Public school proficiency test score; percentage of 
students in school district at or above proficient in 
year 2000 math section of Ohio 12
th grade 
proficiency test (3) 
58.9 
(15.3) 
Public Excellent  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent believes his 
own public school district is excellent (1) 
0.27 
(0.45) 
Public Good  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent believes his 
own public school district is good (1) 
0.30 
(0.46) 
Public Fair  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent believes his 
own public school district is fair (1) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
Graduate Degree  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent has a master’s, 
Ph.D, or professional degree (1) 
0.20 
(0.40) 
Bachelor  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent has a bachelor’s 
degree as highest degree (1) 
0.32 
(0.46) 
Associate  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent has an 
associate’s degree as highest degree (1) 
0.07 
(0.30) 
Some College  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent has attended 
college but did not earn a college degree as 
highest level of education (1) 
0.22 
(0.42) 
High School Grad  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent’s highest level 
of education is a high school diploma or equivalent 
(1) 
0.15 
(0.35) 
Some High School  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent’s highest level 
of education is that they completed some high 
school without graduating (1) 
0.03 
(0.18) 
No High School  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent’s highest level 
of education is less than attending high school (1) 
0.003 
(0.06) 
Income  Respondent’s family income; midpoint of income 
categories in tens of thousands of U.S. dollars, 
7.78 
(5.76) assuming $300,000 as highest income (1) 
Kids05  Number of children ages 0 to 5 living in 
respondent’s  house at least half of the time (1) 
0.47 
(0.79) 
Kids617  Number of children ages 6 to 17 living in 
respondent’s  house at least half of the time (1) 
0.70 
(0.98) 
School Disciplines  Number of disciplinary actions per 100 students at 
school district level for 2000-1 school year (4) 
49.6 
(36.2) 
Opinion Own Public  Respondent’s opinion of quality of his own public 
school district, where 1 = poor, 2 = not good, 3 = 
fair, 4 = good, and 5 = excellent (1) 
3.39 
(1.51) 
Opinion Own Private  Respondent’s opinion of quality of his nearest 
private school, where 1 = poor, 2 = not good, 3 = 
fair, 4 = good, and 5 = excellent (1) 
3.17 
(1.99) 
Opinion Typical Public  Respondent’s opinion of quality of the typical 
public school district in Ohio, where 1 = poor, 2 = 
not good, 3 = fair, 4 = good, and 5 = excellent (1) 
2.86 
(1.32) 
House Price  Sale price of respondent’s house in 2000 in U.S. 
dollars (5) 
130,770 
(75,948) 
Private Attend Rate  Percentage of students in Census block group 
enrolled in grades 1-12 who attend private schools 
(6) 
19.9 
(17.7) 
Blue Collar  Percentage of employed civilian population age 
16+ in Census block group with blue collar jobs;   
blue collar defined as the following occupations:  
farming, protective services, food preparation, 
fishing and forestry, construction, extraction and 
maintenance, production, transportation, and 
material moving (6) 
27.9 
(13.1) 
Attend Public  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent has children 
who attend public school (1) 
0.35 
(0.48) 
Attend Private  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent has children 
who attend private school (1) 
0.12 
(0.32) 
Attend Both  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent has children 
who attend both public and private school (1) 
0.04 
(0.19) 
Black  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent is racially black 
(1) 
0.11 
(0.31) 
Hispanic  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent is ethnically 
Hispanic of any race (1) 
0.02 
(0.13) 
Asian  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent is racially of 
Asian or Pacific Islander descent (1) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
Indian  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent is racially of 
American Indian, Intuit, or Aleutian descent (1) 
0.003 
(0.057) 
Other Race  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent is non-white but 
of some other racial/ethnic mix other than the 
above categories (1) 
0.01 
(0.12) 
White  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent is racially white 
(1) 
0.85 
(0.36) % Minority School  Percent non-white enrollment in public school 
district (7) 
30.6 
(27.9) 
Rural  Percentage of housing units in Census block group 
that are in rural areas (6) 
1.21 
(5.89) 
Number of observations = 1240.  Sources:  (1) = survey instrument, (2) = sample selection probit 
from appendix, (3) = Ohio Department of Education (2002a), (4) = Ohio Department of 
Education (2002c), (5) = FARES (2002), (6) = GeoLytics (2002), (7) = Ohio Department of 
Education (2002b) 
 
    
Table 2 
Probit Results 
Dependent Variable = Choice Yes 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Baseline  Race 1  Race 2  School 
Outcomes 1 
School 
Outcomes 2 
Income  0.000084 
(0.01) 
-0.00012 
(-0.02)    
0.00016 
(0.02) 
0.00012 
(0.02) 
-0.0012 
(-0.16) 
Minority  0.20* 
(1.93) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.20* 
(1.93) 
0.22* 
(2.13) 
Age  -0.0033 
(-1.02) 
-0.0031 
(-0.98)    
-0.0034 
(-1.08) 
-0.0033 
(-1.03) 
-0.0035 
(-1.08) 
Male  -0.13* 
(-1.72) 
-0.13* 
(-1.69)    
-0.13 
(-1.64) 
-0.13* 
(-1.72) 
-0.12 
(-1.59) 
Public Proficiency  -0.0097** 
(-3.40) 
-0.0093** 
(-3.27) 
-0.0098* 
(-2.43) 
-0.0098** 
(-3.07) 
- 
- 
School Disciplines  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.00016 
(-0.13) 
- 
- 
Opinion Own Public  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.10** 
(3.94) 
Graduate Degree  -0.35** 
(-3.35) 
-0.35** 
(-3.34)     
-0.35** 
(-3.28) 
-0.35** 
(-3.35) 
-0.34** 
(-3.21) 
Bachelor  -0.060 
(-0.68) 
-0.056 
(-0.63) 
-0.057 
(-0.64) 
-0.060 
(-0.67) 
-0.056 
(-0.63) 
Kids05  0.090* 
(1.79) 
0.090* 
(1.79) 
0.088* 
(1.76) 
0.090* 
(1.79) 
0.094* 
(1.86) 
Kids617  0.10** 
(2.59) 
0.098* 
(2.55) 
0.099** 
(2.60) 
0.10** 
(2.59) 
0.11** 
(2.77) 
House Price  4.61x10
-7 
(0.69) 
4.37x10
-7 
(0.65) 
5.07x10
-7 
(0.76) 
4.51x10
-7 
(0.67) 
1.90x10
-7 
(0.30) 
Blue Collar  0.0082* 
(2.21) 
0.0083* 
(2.23) 
0.0081* 
(2.12) 
0.0081* 
(2.19) 
0.0096** 
(2.67) 
Black  - 
- 
0.23* 
(1.89) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Hispanic  - 
- 
0.29 
(1.07) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Asian  - 
- 
0.18 
(0.58) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Indian  - 
- 
-0.56 
(-0.87) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Other Race   - 
- 
0.039 
(0.12) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
White  - 
- 
- 
- 
0.0021 
(0.01) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
% Minority School  - 
- 
- 
- 
0.0040 
(1.08) 
- 
- 
- 
- White * % Minority 
School 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.0047 
(-1.24) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.18 
(0.61) 
0.18 
(0.61) 
0.17 
(0.58) 
0.17 
(0.57) 
0.19 
(0.63) 
Constant  -0.22 
(-0.38) 
-0.24 
(-0.42) 
-0.18 
(-0.26) 
-0.19 
(-0.30) 
-0.48 
(-0.85) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.046  0.047  0.047  0.046  0.048 
Ln pseudo-likelihood  -812.3  -811.5  -811.5  -812.3  -810.3 
Number of observations = 1240.  Parameter estimates shown with signed t-values in parentheses 
below. * = statistically significant at 0.10, ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance. 
 
   Table 3 
Probit Results 
Dependent Variable = Choice Yes 
Explanatory 
Variable 
School 
Outcomes 3 
School 
Outcomes 4 
School 
Outcomes 5 
School 
Outcomes 6 
Education 
Income  -0.0008 
(-0.12) 
-0.0016 
(-0.22) 
0.00025 
(0.04) 
-0.0021 
(-0.30) 
-0.00082 
(-0.12) 
Minority  0.19* 
(1.89) 
0.19* 
(1.89) 
0.18* 
(1.77) 
0.20* 
(1.97) 
0.20* 
(1.98) 
Age  -0.0035 
(-1.08) 
-0.0032 
(-0.98) 
-0.0040 
(-1.26) 
-0.0040 
(-1.21) 
-0.0031 
(-0.96) 
Male  -0.12 
(-1.60) 
-0.12 
(-1.58) 
-0.13* 
(-1.74) 
-0.10 
(-1.34) 
-0.14* 
(-1.89) 
Public Proficiency  -0.0060* 
(-1.93) 
-0.0033 
(-1.01) 
-0.0093** 
(-3.28) 
-0.0045 
(-1.42) 
-0.010 
(-3.58) 
Opinion Own Public  -0.078** 
(-2.79) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.10** 
(3.59) 
- 
- 
Opinion Typical 
Public 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.57* 
(-2.02) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Opinion Own Private  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.11** 
(5.76) 
- 
- 
Public Excellent  - 
- 
-0.44** 
(3.54) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Public Good  - 
- 
-0.36** 
(3.40) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Public Fair  - 
- 
-0.039 
(-0.35) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Graduate Degree  -0.34** 
(-3.18) 
-0.33** 
(-3.13) 
-0.35** 
(-3.28) 
-0.33** 
(-3.05) 
- 
- 
Bachelor  -0.058 
(-0.65) 
-0.057 
(-0.64) 
-0.055 
(-0.62) 
-0.081 
(-0.91) 
- 
- 
Associate  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.38** 
(2.61) 
Some College  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.16 
(1.60) 
High School Grad  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.075 
(0.66) 
Some High School  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.10 
(0.49) 
No High School  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.42 
(0.64) 
Kids05  0.092* 
(1.83) 
0.099* 
(1.95) 
0.089* 
(1.78) 
0.077 
(1.52) 
0.088 
(1.76) 
Kids617  0.11** 
(2.87) 
0.12** 
(2.98) 
0.10** 
(2.63) 
0.12** 
(2.97) 
0.11** 
(2.89) 
House Price  4.51x10
-7 
(0.68) 
5.10x10
-7 
(0.77) 
4.12x10
-7 
(0.62) 
2.38x10
-7 
(0.36) 
4.53x10
-7 
(0.68) Blue Collar  0.0079* 
(2.14) 
0.0079* 
(2.15) 
0.0079* 
(2.15) 
0.0090* 
(2.43) 
0.0082* 
(2.21) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.19 
(0.63) 
0.21 
(0.70) 
0.19 
(0.63) 
0.26 
(0.86) 
0.19 
(0.64) 
Constant  -0.19 
(-0.33) 
-0.45 
(-0.77) 
-0.044 
(-0.08) 
-0.64 
(-1.07) 
-0.39 
(-0.68) 
Pseudo R-squared  0.050  0.057  0.048  0.071  0.043 
Ln pseudo-likelihood  -808.5  -802.7  -810.3  -791.2  -814.4 
Number of observations = 1240.  Parameter estimates shown with signed t-values in parentheses 
below. * = statistically significant at 0.10, ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance. 
 
   Table 4 
Probit Results 
Dependent Variable = Choice Yes 
Explanatory 
Variable 
Kids 1  Kids 2  Capitalization  Distance 1  Distance 2 
Income  -0.0017 
(-0.24) 
0.0048 
(0.51) 
0.014 
(1.29) 
0.000048 
(0.01) 
0.000046 
(0.01) 
Minority  0.21* 
(2.10) 
0.22* 
(2.15) 
0.22 
(1.34) 
0.20* 
(1.92) 
0.20* 
(1.94) 
Age  -0.0049 
(-1.63) 
-0.0046 
(-1.50) 
0.0019 
(0.47) 
-0.0033 
(-1.02) 
-0.0031 
(-0.98) 
Male  -0.11 
(-1.47) 
-0.11 
(-1.41) 
-0.036 
(-0.30) 
-0.13* 
(-1.72) 
-0.13* 
(-1.73) 
Public Proficiency  -0.0083** 
(-2.83) 
-0.0082** 
(-2.84) 
-0.0058 
(-1.28) 
-0.0096** 
(-3.24) 
-0.0095** 
(-3.32) 
Graduate Degree  -0.36** 
(-3.45) 
-0.38** 
(-3.63) 
-0.40* 
(-2.51) 
-0.35** 
(-3.35) 
-0.36** 
(-3.37) 
Bachelor  -0.10 
(-1.17) 
-0.10 
(-1.15) 
-0.12 
(-0.81) 
-0.060 
(-0.68) 
-0.064 
(-0.72) 
Kids05  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.090* 
(1.79) 
0.090* 
(1.79) 
Kids617  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
0.099** 
(2.59) 
0.098** 
(2.57) 
Attend Public  0.062 
(0.74) 
0.27* 
(1.93) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Attend Private  0.55** 
(4.51) 
0.50** 
(2.44) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Attend Both  0.41* 
(2.04) 
-0.055 
(-0.15) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Income*Attend 
Public 
- 
- 
-0.028* 
(-1.86) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Income* Attend 
Private 
- 
- 
0.0036 
(0.19) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
Income* Attend 
Both 
- 
- 
0.055 
(1.46) 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
House Price  3.31x10
-7 
(0.49) 
4.08x10
-7 
(0.60) 
8.68x10
-7 
(0.79) 
4.65x10
-7 
(0.70) 
4.83x10
-7 
(0.72) 
Blue Collar  0.0084* 
(2.26) 
0.0085* 
(2.29) 
0.0073 
(1.19) 
0.0082* 
(2.17) 
0.0083* 
(2.43) 
Distance to Private  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.0014 
(0.10) 
- 
- 
Rural  - 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
- 
-0.0031 
(0.49) 
Inverse Mills Ratio  0.16 
(0.52) 
0.19 
(0.63) 
-0.21 
(-0.50) 
0.18 
(0.61) 
0.18 
(0.62) 
Constant  0.037 
(0.07) 
-0.098 
(-0.17) 
-0.036 
(-0.04) 
-0.22 
(-0.39) 
-0.24 
(-0.42) Pseudo R-squared  0.054  0.058  0.023  0.046  0.046 
Ln pseudo-likelihood  -805.2  -801.7  -320.4  -812.3  -812.2 
Number of observations = 1240, except for “Capitalization” column, with 493 observations of 
homeowners without children.  Parameter estimates shown with signed t-values in parentheses 
below. * = statistically significant at 0.10, ** = statistically significant at 0.01 level of significance. 
 
    
Table A1 
Sample Selection Probit 
Dependent Variable is Responded 
Variable Name  Definition (Source)  Mean  
(Std. Dev.) 
Probit 
Results 
Responded  Dummy variable = 1 if person responded 
to the phone survey (1) 
0.122     
(0.327) 
- 
- 
Bathrooms  Number of full bathrooms (toilet plus 
shower) in respondent’s house (2) 
1.415       
(0.56) 
-0.074* 
(3.76) 
House Size  Thousands of square feet of floor space 
of respondent’s house (2) 
1.573       
(0.57) 
0.0001** 
(6.91) 
Patio  Dummy variable = 1 if respondent’s 
house has a patio (2) 
0.066       
(0.25) 
0.15* 
(6.13) 
Attendance Rate  Student attendance rate for 1999-2000 
school year for respondent’s public 
school district (3) 
 
92.711       
(3.37) 
 
0.018** 
(9.73) 
Distance to Hazard  Distance from respondent’s house to 
nearest environmental hazard in miles 
(4,5) 
 
0.942      
(0.65) 
 
-0.051* 
(3.28) 
Air Pollution  Point source releases of air pollution in 
100,000s of pounds for Census tract of 
the respondent’s house   (4) 
 
0.116      
(0.92) 
 
0.0847** 
(6.85) 
Racial Heterogeneity  Measure of ethnic heterogeneity in 
respondent’s Census block group, 
ranging from 0 (homogeneous) to 1 
(highly heterogeneous) (6) 
 
0.116       
(0.11) 
 
0.650** 
(8.87) 
Babies  Percentage of persons in respondent’s 
Census block group who are between 0 
and 4 years of age (6) 
 
6.894      
(2.75) 
 
0.020** 
(9.46) 
Single  Percentage of adults in respondent’s 
Census block group who have never 
married (6) 
 
25.643       
(9.63) 
 
0.010** 
(21.93) 
English Speaking  Percentage of persons age 5 and up who 
only speak English at home in 
respondent’s Census block group (6) 
 
93.336       
(5.32) 
 
0.0063 
(2.37) 
High School Education  Percentage of persons 25 years or older 
in respondent’s Census block group 
whose highest educational attainment is 
a high school diploma, including 
equivalency (6) 
 
29.934      
(12.31) 
 
0.0095** 
(12.94) 
Graduate Degree  Percentage of persons 25 years or older 
in respondent’s Census block group 
whose highest educational attainment is 
a graduate degree, either Master’s, 
Doctorate, or professional school degree 
 
10.194       
(9.60) 
 
0.0083** 
(6.98) (6) 
Blue Collar  Percentage of employed civilian 
population age 16+ in respondent’s 
Census block group with blue collar jobs;  
blue collar defined as being in the 
following occupations:  farming, 
protective services, food preparation, 
fishing and forestry, construction, 
extraction and maintenance, production, 
transportation, and material moving (6) 
 
 
 
29.180      
(13.32) 
 
 
 
-0.0048* 
(4.04) 
Income 
Heterogeneity 
Coefficient of variation for household 
income in respondent’s Census block 
group (higher means more 
heterogeneous) (6) 
 
0.690       
(0.15) 
 
0.400** 
(9.49) 
Poverty  Percentage of persons in respondent’s 
Census block group living in a family 
whose total family income is below the 
poverty threshold appropriate for that 
family (6) 
 
8.078       
(8.82) 
 
-0.0090** 
(9.42) 
Not Crowded Housing  Percentage of owner-occupied housing 
units in respondent’s Census block group 
that have 0.50 or fewer occupants per 
room (6) 
 
80.098       
(8.87) 
 
0.0046* 
(4.06) 
Number of observations = 10,498 (1) = survey instrument, (2) = FARES (2002), (3) Ohio 
Department of Education (2002b), (4) U.S. EPA (2002a), (5) U.S. EPA (2002b), (6) GeoLytics 
(2002).  Parameter estimates shown with Wald chi-square values in parentheses below.  ** = 
statistically significant at 1% level, * = statistically significant at 10% level. 
 
    
Table A2 
Role of School Quality in Survey Non-Response 
 
Good 
School
a 
Support Choice 
No  Yes  Total 
No  320  311  631 
Yes  403  248  651 
Total  723  559  1282 
 
 
 
 
Test Statistic  DF 
Statistic 
Value  P-Level 
Chi-Square  1  16.3205  <.0001 
Likelihood 
Ratio Chi-
Square  1  16.3527  <.0001 
Continuity 
Adj. Chi-
Square  1  15.8686  <.0001 
Mantel-
Haenszel Chi-
Square  1  16.3078  <.0001 
a Good school = 1 if above median pass rate on  math2profabove00 (59.2%) 
                                                           
1 Many of these programs are discussed in West (1997), Toma (1996), Willms and Echols (1992), and Gauri and 
Vawda (2003). 
2 The rate of refusal by those answering the phone was 44%, a number we found to be quite high.  The survey was 
relatively short, so the refusals may have been related to subject matter; in particular, those without children are 
less interested in school issues and thus less likely to respond.  We address this with a selection model. 
3 A contingency table, reported in Table A2, confirms this hypothesis (Chi-square(1) = 16.32). 
4 In comparing the basic model from Table 2 with a model that doesn’t include the IMR (not reported), we see that 
the effect of having children in the house of school age or pre-school cage is slightly understated in the 
uncorrected model.  The effect of school quality is also understated in the uncorrected model and the effect of 
blue collar workers is overstated.  These differences justify use of the IMR, even though its coefficient is 
insignificant. 
5 The LR test statistic is 0.0013, with a marginal probability of 0.97 and a chi-square value of 6.64.  The Moran’s I 
test statistic is 0.056 with a marginal probability of 0.40. 
6 With a critical value of 18.5 at the 1% level, the calculated Breusch-Pagan test statistic is 88.3.                                                                                                                                                                                            
7 One might also suspect multicollinearity, but the correlations among the explanatory variables are not 
particularly high, and parsimonious specifications could not make Income anywhere close to statistically 
significant. 
8 In fact, in an unreported regression we add Ndist, the number of school districts in an urban area, and 
Ndist*Income to the baseline regression, finding the interaction term negative and Income positive, results 
consistent with Brunner and Imazeki (2006). 
9 Keeping Income and deleting House Price did not make Income significant, and vice versa.  
10 Except in one regression that does not use individual survey data, and in that regression, Female has a negative 
sign, opposite what we find. 
11 It may also be consistent with Kenny (2005), who finds school voucher proposals more likely to succeed in states 
with major urban areas (cities with at least 400,000 people in 1990).  Major urban areas in the U.S. tend to have a 
higher proportion of minority residents than smaller cities. 
12 We consider the possibility that black respondents in high minority schools may be more likely to favor school 
choice, but find no difference in pattern of results when we interact these two variables.  
 
13 Thanks to Eric Brunner for suggesting this test. 